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We examine the pyramidal ownership structure of a large sample of newly listed Chinese 
companies controlled by local governments or private entrepreneurs.  Both types of the 
owners use layers of intermediate companies to control their firms.  However, their 
pyramiding behaviors are likely affected by different property rights constraints.  Local 
governments are constrained by the Chinese laws prohibiting free transfer of state 
ownership.  Pyramiding allows them to credibly decentralize their firm decision rights to 
firm management without selling off their ownership. Private entrepreneurs are 
constrained by their lack of access to external funds. Pyramiding creates internal capital 
markets that help relieving their external financing constraints.  Our empirical results 
support these conjectures. Local governments build more extensive corporate pyramids 
when they are less burdened with fiscal or unemployment problems, when they have 
more long-term goals, and when their firm decisions are more subject to market and legal 
disciplines. The more extensive pyramids are also associated with smaller “underpricing” 
when the firms go public.  Entrepreneur owners construct more complex corporate 
pyramids when they do not have a very deep pocket – as indicated by whether they are 
among the top-100 richest people in China. 
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The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China 
1. Introduction 
Many firms around the world are controlled by pyramidal like ownership 
structures (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Lang, 2000).  
On the apex of a pyramid sits a controlling owner who exercises his/her authority on a 
firm rather indirectly through layers of intermediate companies. Why the owner builds 
the pyramid is unclear to academicians.
1 
This paper investigates the formation of corporate pyramids in China – the largest 
transition economy in the world.  It tracks the pyramidal ownership and control structures 
of a comprehensive sample of state and private firms since their initial public offerings 
(IPOs).  It then examines a few determinants for the extensiveness of the pyramids 
controlling the firms. The paper also examines how public stock investors perceive 
corporate pyramidal layers, as reflected in the level of first-day stock price returns after 
the IPOs.  
Focusing on Chinese corporate pyramids provides a few advantages. First, 
China’s young market economy allows us to investigate corporate pyramids close to their 
inception. Second, China’s diverse markets and geographic regions provide sufficient 
variations in institutional settings that potentially affect the emergence of corporate 
pyramids.  Third, the co-existence of state and private owners in China allows a 
comparison of their incentives of building corporate pyramids.   
                                                 
1There have been only a few theories. First, a pyramid creates separation of control from ownership that 
helps a controlling owner to enjoy private benefits that may include expropriating wealth from minority 
shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Wolfenzon, 1999).  Second, a 
pyramidal structure facilitates the control of multiple corporations and the cross-subsidization of funds 
among affiliated firms (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2004).   2
Our sample includes 750 newly IPO firms majority-owned by Chinese local 
governments and 62 firms controlled by entrepreneurs in the private sector.
2 Because 
little prior research exists, our approach is to identify basic institutional constraints that 
potentially regulate the pyramiding behavior of the firm owners.  First, under China’s 
socialist regime government-owned assets and equity stakes are prohibited from being 
freely sold, whereas entrepreneur-owned assets and shares are not subject to this 
restriction.  Second, under China’s highly regulated financial systems, private sector 
entrepreneurs and their firms do not have the same level of playing field in obtaining 
external funds, compared with government-owned firms.  The different property rights 
constraints imposed on the firms generate different incentive and behavioral implications. 
For a local government that does not have the rights to sell, it is unable to use 
outright sales as a means to transfer its decision rights in the firm to a third party.  When 
conditions arise making such decentralization desirable, the local government will 
consider other methods that can credibly decentralize the decision rights short of actual 
transfer of ownership.  Simply telling the firm managers that they have the rights to make 
decisions does not work, because the managers believe that there is a non-trivial 
probability that the government will take their power back.  We conjecture that the local 
government can create pyramidal layers between itself and the firm to credibly 
decentralize.  Pyramiding is a more credible means of decentralizing than is the policy 
order, because the government has to incur bureaucratic costs should it ex post intervene 
the firm management through the layers of corporate pyramids. Consistent with this 
conjecture, our sample shows that Chinese government often inserts between itself and 
                                                 
2 We exclude firms that are controlled by the central government because in our later analyses, we want to 
take advantage of the variations of institutional settings where the local government-controlled firms 
operate.   3
the firm pyramidal layers such as a state asset management company (that operates more 
like a commercial rather than government unit) or a large corporate group with multiple 
layers of companies.  
By contrast, entrepreneurs are not subject to the no-right-to-sell rule. They can 
freely relinquish their decision rights of firms by selling off part or all of their shares or 
assets.  It can be expected that the decentralization motive of pyramiding is weaker for 
entrepreneur-owned firms.  Rather, China’s private entrepreneurs’ pyramiding behavior is 
more likely due to their external financing constraints.  Building pyramids allows an 
entrepreneur to create an internal capital market (Williamson, 1985; Stein, 1997) that 
facilitates cross-subsidization of funds.  On the other hand, firms controlled by local 
governments are expected to be subject to a much lower degree of financial constraints, 
because the governments can use their policy tools or political ties to free up the firms’ 
access to funds. 
Our empirical results show that both governments and entrepreneurs set up their 
firms into pyramids.  However, their pyramiding decisions are affected by different 
factors.  Local governments build more extensive pyramids on top of their listed 
companies when they are less burdened with unemployment or fiscal problems, and when 
their spending in long-term objectives (education, research and development, etc.) is 
higher.  This suggests that local government’s weaker incentives to impose policy burden 
on the firm and stronger desire for long-term economic achievements result in more 
decentralization. We also find that local-government-affiliated firms belong to more 
extensive pyramids when the degrees of market and legal disciplines provided to the 
firms’ regions are stronger. The market and legal disciplines not only align the   4
government’s interest toward value maximization they also serve as monitoring devices 
against agency problems, both of which encourage more decentralization.  
We do not find the decentralization consideration significantly related to the 
pyramiding of entrepreneur-controlled firms.  Instead, we find that entrepreneurs use 
more extensive pyramids to control their firms when they do not have a very deep pocket.  
Specifically, we find that an entrepreneur creates more pyramidal layers when he/she is 
not one of the top-100 richest entrepreneurs in China.  As expected, we do not find that 
pyramids of government-owned firms are significantly related to financial constraints. 
We perform an analysis of the pricing effects of the corporate pyramids upon the 
IPOs of the Chinese firms.  Our goal is to examine whether China’s equity markets detect 
and capitalize on any beneficial or harmful effects of the corporate pyramids.  We find a 
significantly smaller first-day stock return of a government-controlled IPO firm, when it 
is controlled by a pyramid with more extensive layers, all else equal.  The smaller initial 
return, or smaller “underpricing”, of the IPO stock may have suggested an overall 
beneficial effect of corporate pyramids associated with government ownership. We also 
find that the initial return is negatively related to the degree of market discipline and legal 
protection provided to the geographic region in which the firm is located, suggesting that 
investors take into account the degree of market and legal protection in their IPO pricing 
decisions.  However, we do not find the effect of pyramids or the market and legal factors 
relevant in explaining the initial returns of the IPOs of entrepreneur-controlled firms. 
This paper provides a few contributions to the literature.  First is the 
decentralization effect of pyramidal ownership structure.  We conjecture that this effect is 
not specific to China or government-owned firms, but can apply to situations when arms’   5
length transfer of ownership is undesirable.  The non-transferability of ownership can 
arise from not just state prohibition but also from high transaction costs of firm specific 
assets.  For example, the prestige or reputation of an entrepreneur and his/her firm cannot 
be easily sold to an outsider. Rather, it is best kept within the family.  When agency 
problem is not too large, the entrepreneur may allow managers some autonomy by 
indirectly owning the firm through a pyramid.
3  Second, the paper provides evidence that 
corporate pyramids are more extensively used when agency problems are more contained 
by market and legal disciplines.  This result complements a few prior studies that 
emphasize the agency cost effect of pyramids and groups (Bebchuk, 1999; Wolfenzon, 
1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2002; 
Claessens, Fan, and Lang, 2002). Third, the paper provides additional evidence that 
internal market consideration motivates corporate pyramiding and group formation 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna, 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2004).  Fourth, the 
paper’s evidence of IPO valuation effects is consistent with prior research reporting that 
business group structure sometimes matter to firm performance (Keister, 1999; Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses of the emergence of corporate pyramids in China.  The empirical results of 
the determinants of corporate pyramids are reported in Section 3, and the evidence of IPO 
pricing effects of corporate pyramids is presented in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
                                                 
3 Due to the small number of entrepreneur owned firms in our sample, we are unable to examine this 
possibility closely.   6
 
2. Development of Hypotheses 
  In this section we describe the emergence and the organization of China’s modern 
enterprises and discuss institutional factors that influence controlling owners’ 
(governments’ or private entrepreneurs’) incentives of organizing their enterprises into 
pyramids. 
2.1. The Chinese Pyramids 
  China’s enterprise reforms since the 1980s feature the decentralization of control 
rights of its state owned enterprises (SOEs) from the central government to local 
governments.  Since the creation of the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the 
1990s, local governments have carved out from their SOEs productive assets, organized 
them into corporations, and then partially privatized the corporations through IPO of 
minority portions of the corporate shares.  Over 700 companies have gone public this way 
by year 2001, most of which remain majority owned by local governments. 
  A local government can choose between two different ways in organizing its 
ownership and control structure of a publicly traded company.  One way is to hold the 
shares of the newly listed company directly through a state asset management agency. In 
that case the ownership structure of the company is simple: the local government directly 
owns a controlling stake while minority equity investors collectively own the rest.  
Alternatively, the local government can indirectly own the listed company through a 
pyramid consisting of one to several intermediate companies. If there is one additional 
intermediate company, it is usually a parent SOE or a state asset management company, 
which specializes in managing the assets, while the state asset management agency in the   7
apex of the pyramid continues to serve the government administrative and regulatory 
functions. However, if there are multiple intermediate layers, it usually suggests that the 
local government has transferred the control rights of the listed firm to a large enterprise 
group with multiple layers of companies. In either case, these intermediate pyramidal 
layers are non-publicly traded SOEs solely owned by the local government or jointly 
owned by local government and other government agencies.  Non-government equity 
participation of the intermediate SOEs is uncommon, due to state regulations prohibiting 
free dilution of state ownership.  The chain of intermediate companies is typically formed 
over a period prior to the IPO, through a series of restructuring of SOE assets. Two 
examples are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, showing how a listed firm is directly 
controlled by a state asset management agency and indirectly through a corporate 
pyramid, respectively.
4  
  Along with the state asset management reforms we observe the emergence of 
private firms. These entrepreneur-owned firms have become increasingly important as 
China’s market economy develops.  Since the setting up of the capital markets, a small 
but increasing number of entrepreneurs bring their businesses public by selling shares in 
the two stock markets. Like many government owners of SOEs, the entrepreneurs often 
                                                 
4 The reform of the state asset management system in Shenzhen and Shanghai can shed light on our 
understanding of the emergence of these intermediate pyramidal layers. Back in 1992, the Shenzhen 
government gave the administrative and regulatory functions of the SOEs to a newly established state asset 
management agency called the State Asset Management Committee (SAMC), after the abolition of all 
industry bureaus which used to administer and regulate the SOEs. Five years prior to this, the Shenzhen 
government set up its first asset management company called Shenzhen Investment and Management 
Company, serving the management function like a holding company, rather than a government 
administrative bureau. This and two other companies, Development and Investment Holding Company and 
Trading and Investment Holding Company, subsequently established are the intermediate pyramidal layer 
of listed firms in Shenzhen. Similarly, starting in 1993, the Shanghai government set up its SAMC and 19 
large enterprise groups and holding companies, like the three holding companies in Shenzhen, to manage 
all SOEs under Shanghai government’s jurisdiction. Qian (1996) argue that by the setting up the SAMC, 
and the management and holding companies, both governments hoped to separate the administrative and 
regulatory functions and the management functions, minimizing the political influence of the government 
over the SOEs.   8
control their publicly listed companies through pyramids.  However, unlike governments 
who typically have full ownership of the intermediate companies along the pyramids, 
entrepreneurs sometimes introduce outside equity participation of their intermediate 
companies, resulting in a divergence between the ownership and control of the listed 
company. Figure 3 provides an example of an entrepreneur setting up corporate pyramid 
to control a listed firm.  
  In the following, we provide two potential explanations for why pyramidal 
ownership is widely adopted by China’s government and private owners. The first 
explanation is based on local governments’ incentive to decentralize decision making to 
firm management. The second explanation is based on controlling owners’ incentive of 
creating internal capital markets to cross subsidize their firms. 
2.2. The incentive to decentralize 
We pay attention to the possibility that a corporate pyramid serves as a device for 
a local government to decentralize control rights to firm managers.   Due to regulations 
that prohibit the dilution of state ownership, the government cannot relinquish control by 
freely selling off its firm ownership stake.
5 Creating the corporate pyramid serves as an 
alternative means of decentralization.  
The decentralization decision is made when the local government decides whether 
to have a state asset management agency control the listed firm either directly or 
indirectly through a chain of companies such as a state asset management company or a 
large corporate group of SOEs. By choosing the latter option, the government can allow a 
credible transfer of decision rights, because the additional intermediate layers are 
                                                 
5 Alchian (1965) and Karpoff and Rice (1988) provide analyses on the effects of non-transferable property 
rights on organization and incentive.   9
associated with higher bureaucratic costs
6 should the government intervene the firm’s 
decision making.  
What, then, affect the local government’s incentive of relinquishing control of the 
firm? The key consideration is the degree of conflicts between government and firm 
objectives.  The larger is the degree of the conflicts, the larger is the benefit of the 
government’s control. Conversely, the local government’s control benefit is smaller when 
its objectives are more consistent with those of the firm. 
Specifically, a local government burdened with poor fiscal conditions or 
unemployment wants a firm to subsidize public expenditure or support employment, both 
are against the interest of a value maximizing firm.  However, strong market discipline 
and legal enforcement work to align the interest of the government and firm management 
toward firm value maximization.
7  Therefore it would be in the government’s interest to 
decentralize its firm decision rights to the management.  By giving decision rights to firm 
managers who possess professional skills and local knowledge, the decentralization 
enhances efficiency in firm decision making (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) that is 
important in the more competitive market environment. 
We therefore expect that the degree of decentralization is affected by the extent to 
which the local government focuses on firm efficiency and the degrees of market and 
legal disciplines that strengthen the focus.  That is to say, the degree of decentralization 
                                                 
6 Organizing business activities within the firm (instead of the market) involves bureaucratic costs. These 
costs arise from the propensity to manage, to forgive mistakes, and logrolling (Williamson, 1985). Shirley 
and Walsh (2001) discuss the potential effect of setting up a corporation in reducing government 
intervention: “if an enterprise is run as a department of a ministry, with its managers directly appointed by 
a minister of chief executive, then political interventions will be easy and common. Alternatively, if the 
government acts as the dominant shareholder of a largely independent firm, acting through a board of 
directors, political intervention may be possible but is more costly and more transparent.” 
7 Conflicts of interest can also arise because the firm managers’ objectives deviate from firm profit 
maximization. The alignment-of-interest effect of the strong market and legal discipline work the same 
under the double agency setting.     10
depends on the set of objectives adopted by the local government and the set of 
institutional factors that collectively affect market and legal disciplines.  The complexity 
of corporate pyramidal layers that control a public traded company, a proxy for 
decentralization, should vary systematically with these government objectives and 
institutional factors.  Two sets of testable hypotheses follow. 
z  The more the local government focuses on firm profit maximization, the more 
extensive is the firm’s pyramidal ownership structure.   
z  The stronger the market and legal institutions in which the firm operates, the 
more extensive is the pyramid that controls it. 
It can also be expected that compared with those of the entrepreneur-controlled 
firms, the pyramidal structures of government-owned firms are more sensitive to the 
above effects.
8  This is possible for two reasons. First, multiple objectives (resulting from 
policy burdens) and bureaucratic costs are more applicable to government-owned firms 
than to entrepreneur-owned firms.  Second, unlike government leaders who may not have 
specialized skills for running businesses, entrepreneurs typically have better business 
knowledge and skills.  Private owners also more fully bear the consequences of firm 
profitability than do government owners. Therefore the private owners’ benefits of co-
locating knowledge and decision rights through decentralization are lower than those of 
local government owners.   
 
 
                                                 
8 However, entrepreneurs may build pyramids to conceal assets or information subject to predation by 
governments or competitors.  This can be relevant when the entrepreneurs operate in institutional 
environments that offer weak property rights protection. 
   11
2.3. The incentive to create internal capital markets 
Another possible explanation for corporate pyramids is relieving financial 
constraints.  Affiliated firms connected by a pyramid can use internal funds to cross-
subsidize each other, so as to reduce their reliance on external financing. Such internal 
capital markets can be beneficial if the external financial markets are subject to severe 
distortions (Williamson, 1985; Stein, 1997).  Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) show that 
corporate pyramids will more likely be used when internal funds are important in 
financing investment projects, because pyramids allow entrepreneurs to utilize the entire 
stock of retained earnings of the firm it controls.  They further show that pyramids will be 
more popular in countries with poorer investor protection, because in those environments 
the internal financing advantage of pyramids is greater.  
However, creating internal capital markets can induce organizational costs that 
lead to misallocation of capital (Scharfstein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). As shown by Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002) and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002), the 
complex ownership structures that accompany internal markets can result in managerial 
entrenchment, the effects of which are reflected in investors’ pricing decisions.
9  
The internal market view predicts that corporate pyramids will be used when the 
controlling owner does not have a deep pocket and when market and legal environments 
are weak.  However, considering that internal organizational costs are also greater in 
                                                 
9 Consistent with the existence of benefits and costs of internal markets, Claessens, Fan, and Lang (2002) 
find that financially burdened East Asian firms benefit from group affiliation; mature and slow-growing 
firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, 
while young and high-growth firms more likely lose.   12
regions with weak institutions and market disciplines, it becomes unclear as to whether 
and when it pays to build pyramids in those environments. 
In the context of China, we expect that the incentive to build internal financial 
markets through pyramiding is stronger for entrepreneur-owned firms than for 
government owned firms.  Private entrepreneurs and their businesses have been 
disadvantaged in their access to external funds under China’s socialist regime (Brandt 
and Li, 2003).  By contrast, local governments and their firms have better access to 
external funds, because they control policy tools and connections to influence the 
investment decisions of the finance sector.  
 
3. Empirical results – determinants of corporate pyramids 
3.1. The sample 
  Starting in 2001, publicly traded companies in China are required to report in 
annual reports detailed ownership information, including the structures of pyramidal 
ownership chains, of their controlling shareholders.  Based on the ownership information 
disclosed in 2001 annual reports, we trace back the ownership information to the IPO 
year for each existing company traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
If there is no change in the controlling owner, we determine that the ownership chain to 
remain the same since the IPO.
10 If there is any change in controlling shareholder, we 
identify the controlling shareholder and the ownership structure on the IPO year from the 
IPO prospectus, media reports, and the websites of the company and its affiliated 
                                                 
10 If the controlling owner reorganized ownership structure without changing his/her controlling owner 
status, it would introduce noise to our sample that biases against our hypotheses. As diagnostic checks, we 
rerun several key regression analyses using that year 2001 data instead of the IPO-year data (see footnotes 
10 and 11).    13
companies. Most listed state firms are restructured and spun off from parent SOEs prior 
to their IPOs. The restructuring process is disclosed in the IPO prospectus, which also 
provides us information about the identities of ultimate shareholder.  Company websites 
and media reports are particularly useful for tracing ownership information of private 
firms. Specifically, the New Fortune Magazine’s reports of the top-100 family firms 
allow us to trace the controlling owners of listed private firms. 
  In addition to the ownership data, we gather financial data from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) Database and the Genius Database compiled by the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange.  We also put together regional macroeconomic data from sources 
described in Appendix 1. 
  We start with the complete list of IPO firms in China during 1993 through 2001. 
We exclude firms that are controlled by the central government (12% of total population), 
collectives (4%), other owner types (5%) including the military, public universities, 
public research institutes, financial intermediaries, and work unions, and firms whose 
ultimate owners cannot be identified (3%). We also exclude firms whose financial data 
are unavailable (1%).  Our final sample, as described in Table 1, consists of 750 local 
government-controlled firms and 62 firms controlled by private owners, together 
represents 75 percent of all IPO firms in China during 1993 through 2001.  As in Table 1, 
the year-by-year coverage of the sample is also quite representative, covering the 
majority of IPOs in each year.  It is clear that most of the IPOs involve government-
controlled firms. However, the IPOs of entrepreneur-controlled firms increase over time. 
 
   14
3.2. Measuring the extents of corporate pyramids 
  From the disclosed structure of pyramidal ownership chains of each company, we 
identify the chain(s) connecting the largest ultimate owner and the company in question. 
We choose the longest pyramidal chain (if there are multiple chains) and then count the 
number of corporate layers between the ultimate owner and the company in question.  We 
use the number of layers of the longest pyramidal chain as a proxy for the extent of 
corporate pyramid controlling the company. 
Figure 3 provides an example of the pyramidal chains that control Xiamen 
Prosolar Technology Development Co., Ltd. The company is ultimately owned by four 
large shareholders, three individuals and a local government.  From their ownership 
positions on the weakest links of the control chains between these owners and the 
company, we identify that Ren Mei has the largest voting rights 32.41%.  We therefore 
identify him as the largest ultimate owner.  Ren Mei controls the company through two 
pyramidal chains, each goes through two intermediate companies before reaching the 
company in question. We therefore determine that the company is controlled by Ren Mei 
through 3-layer pyramids.  We also calculate that Ren Mei has only 8.77% cash flow 
rights of the company, by multiplying the ownership percentages along each of the two 
pyramidal control chains and then summing up the two numbers. This method of 
identifying largest owners, and determining voting and cash flow rights is consistent with 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999).   
  Using this method, we measure corporate pyramidal layers for all the sample 
firms. Table 2 Panel A reports the basic statistics.  Among the 750 government-controlled 
firms, 190 (25%) is directly controlled by local governments, as they are associated with   15
only one corporate layer.  Among the 750 firms, 468 (62%) are controlled by two-layer 
pyramids, 88 (12%) are controlled by three-layer pyramids, and 9 (1%) are controlled by 
pyramids that are more than four layers.  Among the 62 entrepreneur-controlled firms, 
only one is directly controlled by the largest owner; 41 (64%) are controlled by two-layer 
pyramids, 18 (29%) are controlled by three-layer pyramids, and three (5%) controlled by 
pyramids of more than four layers.  From these statistics, it is clear that pyramidal 
corporate structure is prevalent in China.  In particular, two-layer pyramids, where the 
listed enterprise is controlled by a government agency through a state asset management 
company or another SOE, are most popular.  
  Table 2 Panel B reports the summary statistics of the ratio of the largest ultimate 
owner’s cash flow to voting rights.  It shows that government-controlled firms are 
associated with almost no separation between voting and cash flow rights. This is not 
surprising because state regulations prohibit local governments from freely selling shares 
of companies that they directly or indirectly control. By contrast, there is a significant 
separation between ownership and control of entrepreneur-owned firms.  The mean 
(median) ratio of cash flow to voting rights of the largest owner is 54% (52%).  Like the 
rest of the world, China’s entrepreneurs build corporate pyramids that result in 
divergence of their voting rights from cash flow rights. 
3.3. Measuring the determinants of corporate pyramids 
  In this subsection we discuss the empirical measures that capture (1) local 
government short- and long-term incentives, (2) market and legal institutions, (3) 
financial constraints, and (4) management capacity. We also discuss their predicted 
relations with the extent of corporate pyramid.  Appendix 1 provides the definitions and   16
the sources of the macro and institutional variables. Table 3 provides the summary 
statistics of these variables. 
3.3.1. Local government incentives 
  We employ a few regional macro variables as proxies for local governments’ 
short- and long-term incentives.  The first is the unemployment rate of the local 
government’s jurisdiction. The second is a dummy variable equal to one if the local 
government’s fiscal balance (income minus expenditure) is within the top quartile of the 
sample, and otherwise zero.  The third variable is a proxy for the local government’s 
long-term incentive. It is the total research and development (R&D) expenditure of the 
local government’s region scaled by regional gross domestic product (GDP).  To be 
consistent with the decentralization hypothesis, a controlling owner’s incentive of 
building pyramids is expected to be negatively related to the regional unemployment rate, 
while positively related to the local government’s fiscal condition and R&D expenditure. 
3.3.2. Market and legal institutions 
  We use four regional macro variables to proxy for the degree of development of 
China’s regional markets and legal environments.  The first variable is a marketization 
index capturing the overall market development, including the degrees of market 
competition and government intervention, and the strength of legal environment.  The 
second variable is an index of the quality of legal environment.  The third is an index of 
property right protection, measuring the number of legal cases and the court’s efficiency 
in resolving these conflicts.  These regional indexes, compiled by Fan and Wang (2001), 
are regarded as reasonable measures of the market and legal conditions of China’s diverse 
regions.  In addition, we also use an index of deregulation constructed by Demruger et al.   17
(2002).  The index captures the amount of preferential policies granted to the region by 
the central government.  It can be expected that the higher the deregulation index, the 
more developed is the region’s markets. These market and legal discipline variables 
proxy for the government’s degree of incentive alignment towards profit maximization. 
According to our hypotheses, market and legal discipline is positively associated with the 
complexity of pyramidal layers of the listed enterprise.  
3.3.3. Financial constraints 
  Empirically measuring the degree of financial constraint of a firm or a business 
group is difficult.  We attempt to do so for the ultimate owner, the entrepreneur 
himself/herself. New Fortune, a business magazine in China, publishes a list of top-400 
richest people in China in year 2004. We also refer to the Forbes’ ranking of top-100 
richest people in China between 2001 and 2004. Using this information we create two 
dummy variables: Rich100 and Rich400.  Rich100 equals one if a firm’s controlling 
owner is one of the top-100 richest people in the Forbes list, and otherwise zero.  
Rich400 equals one if a firm’s controlling owner appears in the New Fortune list while 
not in the Forbes list, and otherwise zero.  We expect that a firm’s financial constraint is 
most severe if its controlling owner is not on the list, i.e., when Rich100 and Rich400 
both equal zero.  By contrast, a firm is said to be least financially constrained if its 
controlling owner is among the top-100 on the list, i.e., when Rich100 equals 1 and 
Rich400 equals 0. 
We expect that government-controlled firms are less subject to the financial 
constraint issue.  Nevertheless, we are interested in a few of the above regional macro 
variables that may reflect a local government’s ability to subsidize its firms financially. It   18
can be expect that a government owner is more financially constrained if it faces more 
severe unemployment or budget deficit problems. To be consistent with the internal 
market view, the extents of pyramids of government owned firms should be positively 
related to the regional unemployment rate while negatively related to regional fiscal 
health. It is interesting to note that these predicted effects are opposite to those offered by 
the decentralization incentive. 
3.3.4. Management capacity 
In addition to the macro variables, we include a few firm-level control variables: 
firm size, growth, and financial leverage.  Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Growth is measured by the market-to-book equity ratio defined as market 
value of common equity divided by book value of equity, with the market price measured 
at the end of the first year on which the firm went public. Financial leverage is measured 
as total debt divided by total sales.  
Larger firms are more complex to manage. Firms with higher market-to-book 
ratios have higher growth opportunities relative to their assets in place.  Highly leveraged 
firms have higher financial burdens.  These firms are more likely to be decentralized by 
controlling owners, providing they are lack of the needed knowledge or management 
skills relative to local management.  
Since governments are more likely to be subject to the management capacity 
problem than entrepreneurs, we expect that the effects of firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
and leverage are stronger on government-controlled firms than on firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs.   
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3.4. Regression results 
We perform regression analysis separately on the sample of government-
controlled and entrepreneur-controlled firms.  The dependent variable is the number of 
corporate pyramidal layers, ranging from 1 to 5.  Therefore we employ the ordered probit 
model in the regression analysis.  Because a few of the regional macro variables are 
highly correlated, our strategy is to include these macro variables one at a time in 
separate regressions. In addition to the regional macro variables and the firm-level 
variables, we include a regulatory industry dummy, and a set of year dummy variables.
11 
The regulatory industry dummy equals one if the firm primary operate in the natural 
resources, public utilities, finance, or the transportation industry, and otherwise zero.  
There are totally eight year dummy variables each representing a year during 1994 
through 2001. A year dummy variable equals one if the firm went public during that year, 
and otherwise zero. 
3.4.1. Government-controlled firms 
  Table 4 reports the regression results of the government-owned firms sample.  
Column (1) reports the results of the basic model including only the firm-level variables.  
Consistent with the view that local government decentralizes in part due to limited 
management capacity, corporate pyramid is positively related to the firm size, growth, 
and financial leverage measures, and is statistically significant for the firm size and 
financial leverage measures.  Columns (2) through (4) include the government objective 
variables one by one, in addition to the firm variables and other control variables.  The 
                                                 
11 To control for any effects of regional wealth and growth, we include regional GDP and GDP growth as 
additional independent variables, but fail to find their effects significant. We therefore exclude these 
variables from the regression analysis. 
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regression results clearly show that corporate pyramid is negatively related to the 
unemployment rate, while positively related to the fiscal health and R&D expenditures of 
local governments.  Column (5) reports the results of the regressions that include all the 
three regional macro variables, and shows that the effects of unemployment and fiscal 
condition remain statistically significant.  This evidence is consistent with the view that 
local governments’ objectives affect their incentive of decentralizing control of their 
firms through building pyramids.  By contrast, the government owned-firms’ pyramidal 
structures are less likely to be affected by the incentive to relieve financial constraints, as 
the effects of regional unemployment and fiscal health go against its predictions. 
  Across the columns, the effects of the firm-level variables are consistent.  
Whether the firm belongs to a regulatory industry does not matter to its pyramidal 
structure. 
  Table 5 reports the results of the regressions that include the market and legal 
variables, in addition to the firm-level and the government objective variables.  The 
results show that the extent of the pyramids of a government-controlled firm is 
significantly positively related to the degree of marketization, legal environment 
development, property rights protection, and deregulation of the region in which the firm 
operates.  After including these variables, the effects of the three government objective 
variables become weakened. However, the positive effect of government fiscal health 
remains significant.  The results associated with the remaining firm variables remain 
similar.
12  
                                                 
12 As a diagnostic check, we repeat regressions in Table 4 and 5 using data, not from the IPO year, but from 
year 2001 during which the data for pyramidal layers are most accurately determined. The results remain 
qualitatively similar.    21
  Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 support the hypothesis that local 
governments use corporate pyramids to decentralize their control rights of firms to the 
management. 
3.4.2. Entrepreneur-controlled firms 
  Table 6 reports the regression results of the 62 entrepreneur-controlled firms.  
Column (1) reports the results of regressions with only firm-level variables.  The results 
show that the pyramid of an entrepreneur-controlled firm is less extensive when the 
entrepreneur has a deeper pocket (being list on the top-100 richest person list).  Columns 
(2) through (8) report the results including the regional macro variables.  As the results 
show, pyramids show little relations with these macro variables.  An exception is the 
significant positive effect of deregulation. This suggests that market competitions induce 
entrepreneurs to decentralize their decision rights. Also, the market disciplines resulting 
from deregulations allow decentralization without incurring too much organization costs.  
The effects of Rich100 variable, a proxy for deep pocket, are robust to the inclusion of 
the macro variables.  We also find that pyramid is weakly positively related to firm 
growth but are insignificantly related to firm size and financial leverage.  Whether a firm 
belongs to a regulatory industry has little effect on pyramid. 
  We report earlier that, different from those of the government-controlled firms, 
the pyramids of the entrepreneur-controlled firms are associated with substantial 
separation between ownership and control. We use the ratio of the controlling owner’s 
cash flow rights to voting rights to capture the separation.  In Column (9), we report the 
results of an ordinary least square regression using the cash flow-voting rights ratio as the 
dependent variable.  The regression results are similar to those in Column (1) when the   22
number of pyramidal layers is used as the dependent variable.  We find that the Rich100 
and the financial leverage variables have positive effects on the degree of divergence 
between voting and cash flow rights created by the pyramid.  As none of the regional 
macro variables matter to the voting-cash flow rights measure, we do not report these 
results in the table.
13  
  Overall, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that the extent of pyramid of an 
entrepreneur-controlled firm is related to the entrepreneur’s wealth constraint.  This lends 
support to the internal market hypothesis.  By contrast, the entrepreneur firm’s pyramidal 
structure is unrelated to the government, market, and legal environment factors that have 
been shown relevant to the pyramidal structures of the government-controlled firms. 
 
4. Corporate pyramids and IPO initial returns 
In this section, we examine the first-day stock returns of the newly listed 
companies in China.  It is well known that the initial returns of IPO stocks are positive 
relative to the market returns, suggesting that the stocks are “underpriced” immediately 
prior to their IPOs.
14 The positive initial return, or underpricing, has been attributed to 
theories related to information asymmetry (Rock, 1986; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; 
Welch, 1989 and 1992; Chemmanur, 1993). 
We are interested in finding out whether China’s capital markets capitalize on the 
effects of decentralization and internal market creation associated with the pyramidal 
                                                 
13 We again replicate Table 6 using all year 2001 data and all the coefficients of Rich100 remain significant 
at the 1% to 5% levels.   
14 Welch and Ritter (2002) provide a comprehensive literature review of underpricing in the US, while 
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1996) document empirical evidence of underpricing across 25 countries. 
Mok and Hui (1998), Su and Fleischer (1999), and Chan, Wang, and Wei (2003) find evidence of large 
underpricing in China.    23
structures controlling the firms upon their IPOs.  If the overall effect of pyramiding is 
beneficial and the capital markets effectively capitalize on the effect, the return required 
by the investors of the IPO stocks should be lower on the margin to reflect the beneficial 
effect, all else equal. 
4.1. Basic statistics 
Table 7 reports the summary statistics of the initial return of the IPO firms by 
control type and the number of corporate pyramidal layers.  The sample size for the 
government-controlled firms is 709, and that of the entrepreneur-controlled firms is 62. 
Both are smaller than those in the previous section, because of missing data needed for 
our next regression analysis.  To mitigate the effects of outliers, we winsorize the top- 
and bottom-one percent extreme values.
15  However, there are still extremely large initial 
returns even after the wisorization: the maximum return for both the government and 
entrepreneur-controlled sample is over 560%!  The overall average (median) IPO initial 
return is 183% (132%) for the government-controlled firms, and 206% (151%) for 
entrepreneur-controlled firms.  The differences are statistically significant at 10% level.   
Breaking down by the number of pyramidal layers, we report that, for 
government-controlled firms, the average initial return is 244% for one-layer firms, 162% 
for two-layer firms, 172% for three-layer firms, and 192% for firms with four or more 
layers.  The median statistics show a similar pattern: 169% for one-layer firms, 124% for 
two-layer firms, 113% for three-layer firms, and 141% for four-layer firms.  Excluding 
the eight firms with four or more layers, there appears to be a negative association 
between the initial return and the number of corporate pyramidal layers.  For 
                                                 
15 We have also tried winsorizing the top- and bottom-five percent extreme values and the regression results 
in Table 8 and 9 remain unchanged.   24
entrepreneur-controlled firms, there are no clear patterns on the relation between their 
initial returns and pyramidal layers, perhaps due to the small number of observations and 
the existence of extreme returns. 
4.2. Regression analysis 
  We now perform regression analysis to determine if there exist any pricing effects 
of corporate pyramids upon IPOs.  The dependent variable is the initial return.  The 
independent variables include the number of corporate pyramidal layers, firm size 
measured by log of sales, leverage measured by total debt divided by sales, the initial 
return of the stock market, and the total proceeds of the IPO. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
show that the expected initial return is an increasing function of the uncertainty about the 
market clearing price of an IPO. We use log of sales and the total proceeds of the IPO to 
proxy for the uncertainty due to information asymmetry. It is expected that they are 
negatively related to the IPO underpricing. Similarly, leverage is used in the model to 
control for the information uncertainty of the IPO quality, because high leverage firms 
are exposed to more financial distress risks. We expect that the higher leverage, the larger 
the underpricing.  The initial return of the stock market is included to adjust for the 
market return. The regulatory industry and year dummies are also included to adjust for 
fixed effects of industry and IPO years.  
The initial return can reflect investors’ perception on the degree of protection 
provided by the local government policies, the market disciplines, or legal enforcement. 
If so, we expect that the stronger are these protections, the lower are the initial returns.  
To control for the possibility that the pyramid variable simply pick up the effects of 
government incentives or market and legal disciplines, we alternatively include the   25
regional market, legal, and government incentive variables as additional explanatory 
variables in the regression model. 
4.2.1. Government-controlled firms 
Table 8 reports the ordinary least squares regression results of the government-
controlled firm sample. The effects of the firm-level control variables are as expected.  
Initial return is negatively related to firm size, market return, and IPO proceeds. The 
effects of financial leverage are negative and statistically significant.
16 
The effects of corporate pyramid on initial return are significantly negative across 
all model specifications, suggesting that the magnitude of underpricing is on average 
smaller for IPO firms controlled by more extensively pyramidal structures.  Interestingly, 
the effect of the four market and legal discipline variables are all negative and three of 
them statistically significant, suggesting that investors demand smaller returns when they 
invest in IPO markets that provide better protection.  By contrast, the initial return is 
related to none of the three variables of government incentives (R&D expenditures, the 
unemployment rate, and the fiscal heath).  
The overall evidence from the table suggests that corporate pyramids are 
perceived to be beneficial by the investors of the IPO stocks of the government-controlled 
firms.  The benefit, as supported by our findings in the previous section, can be derived 
from the credible reduction in government intervention due to the high bureaucratic cost 
associated with the intermediate corporate layers along the pyramid.  Moreover, we find 
that the abnormal returns required by IPO investors of government-controlled firms are 
                                                 
16 This result is puzzling because it suggests that financial leverage is viewed as a signaling device, the 
higher the leverage, the better is the IPO quality. However, when total assets or total equity is used as 
deflator for leverage, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant while our key results remain 
unchanged.    26
importantly affected by the degree of investor protection provided through market and 
legal disciplines.  This is a result that has not been documented in the previous literature.  
4.2.2. Entrepreneur-controlled firms 
Table 9 reports the regression results of the entrepreneur-controlled firm sample. 
Here we do not find a significant relation between initial return and corporate pyramid. 
The effects of the market and legal variables are insignificant.  None of the government 
incentive variables show significant effects on initial return.  Consistent with the 
literature, initial return is positively related to market return, while negatively related to 
IPO proceeds. The effects of firm size, financial leverage, and industry are insignificant.  
The overall weaker results are perhaps due to the small sample size. However, the 
insignificant effect of pyramid could mean that there are organizational costs associated 
with pyramiding, which cancel out any beneficial effects of internal markets.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  Pyramid is a popular control structure of corporations around the world.  We do 
not know well enough why owners adopt pyramidal structures to control their firms.  In 
this paper, we have reported the first evidence of pyramidal ownership structures of 
China’s newly IPO firms.  Similar to many firms around the world, most of the Chinese 
firms, government- or entrepreneur-owned, are controlled by pyramids.  The fast 
emergence of corporate pyramids is rather surprising, knowing China’s short history of 
modern capitalism.   27
We have investigated the causes of the formation of corporate pyramids, and have 
found that the reasons are different between the firms controlled by local governments 
and the others controlled by private entrepreneurs.   
Local governments’ incentives of building corporate pyramids are closely related 
to the inability of freely selling off their shares of SOEs, due to the law prohibiting 
transfer of state ownership.  However, when the pressure for decentralizing their decision 
rights of SOEs becomes large, the local governments can use the pyramidal structure to 
decentralize their decision rights of SOEs to firm management.  The decentralization is 
credible because the high bureaucratic costs associated with the pyramids deter ex post 
intervention by the governments.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that 
government-owned firms are associated with more extensive pyramids when local 
government officers are less burdened with unemployment or fiscal problems, or have 
stronger long-term incentives as reflected in their R&D expenditures in their jurisdictions.  
Also consistent with the hypothesis, local governments use more extensive pyramids 
when their market and legal infrastructures provide strong disciplines that mitigate 
conflicts of interest between the governments and the firms. 
By contrast, the incentives for pyramiding by entrepreneurs in China’s growing 
private sector are insignificantly related to the decentralization factors but are 
significantly related to financial constraints.  China’s socialist regime has been unequally 
treating private sector entrepreneurs and their firms, including less favorable conditions 
for their external financing.  China’s emerging financial sectors may also hesitate to 
provide the needed financing to entrepreneurs, for they are new comers and hence are 
lack of reputation that is important for obtaining external funds.  The entrepreneurs’   28
alternative is to create internal financial markets that allow cross-subsidization among 
affiliated firms. Consistent with this internal market view, we find that pyramiding of the 
entrepreneur owned firms is related to the personal wealth constraints of the 
entrepreneurs. 
We have investigated the pricing effects of corporate pyramids upon the IPO of 
the firms.  Consistent with the beneficial effects of decentralization, we find that 
government-controlled firms’ IPO initial required returns are smaller when these firms 
are controlled by more extensive pyramids.  We have also reported that initial returns are 
smaller when the IPO firms operate in regions with strong market and legal disciplines to 
protect investors’ interests.  However, we do not find the initial returns of the 
entrepreneur-owned firms related to corporate pyramids, market, or legal environments.    
It is interesting to find that in case of Chinese government-owned firms, pyramids 
and their bureaucratic costs can actually be an advantage, for they facilitate credible 
decentralization that cannot otherwise be achieved by privatization due to state 
prohibition.  However, bureaucratic costs and decentralization can be important 
considerations for organizational and ownership design in general, not just for Chinese 
firms.  In particular, when a firm possesses firm specific assets that are subject to high 
transaction costs, concentrated ownership can be desirable because it helps capitalize the 
specialized assets.  However, the majority owner of the firm may want to provide 
managers some autonomy so as to improve decision making efficiency.  Since dilution of 
the ownership is undesirable, the owner can alternatively use a pyramidal structure to 
credibly transfer his/her decision rights to the managers.   29
Future research could more fully explore the effects of bureaucratic costs and 
more broadly internal organization costs on the ownership and control structures of firms.  
More research is also needed to understand the causes and effects of corporate pyramids 
under similar or different institutional settings.  
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Source: The 1994 Annual Report of Changchai Company, Ltd. 
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Figure 3 




Sources: The 2001 Annual Report of Xiamen Prosolar Technology Development Co. Ltd. and the New Fortune Magazine (2001.08). 
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The sample is composed of 750 local government-controlled firms and 62 firms 
controlled by private entrepreneurs, totally representing around 75% of all IPO 
firms between 1993 and 2001. To be included in the sample, the ultimate owner 
must possess over 10% of control rights over listed firms and all data used in the 
analysis must be available. The identity of ultimate shareholder is identified based 
on information in annual reports of 2001 and other reference materials in IPO 













1993 80  2  82  66.67 
1994 106  4  110  100.00 
1995 21  0  21  87.50 
1996 112  8  120  59.11 
1997 154  6  160  77.67 
1998 77  7  84  80.00 
1999 63  10  73  75.26 
2000 87  13  100  73.53 
2001 50  12  62  73.81 
Total 750  62  812  74.63   37
Table 2 
Corporate Pyramids in China 
 
Panel A: Pyramidal Layers 
This panel reports the distribution of the number of corporate pyramidal layers, which is 
defined to be one when a state asset management agency directly controls the listed firm, two 
when there is an intermediate company between the government agency and the listed firm, 
and so on. The number of pyramids is counted from the longest control chain in case of 
multiple chains. 
Number of  
Pyramidal 
Layers 










1  190   25.33   1  1.61  
2  464   61.87   40   64.52  
3  87   11.60   18   29.03  
>=4  9   1.20   3   4.84  
Total  750   100   62  100  
  
Panel B: Ratio of Cash Flow to Voting Rights 
The calculation of cash flow and voting rights follows the procedure in La Porta et al (1999).  
    N  Mean  Median 
Std. 
Deviation  Min  Max 
                           
Government-
controlled Firms  750  0.96   1.00   0.12   0.11   1.00  
Entrepreneur-
controlled Firms  62  0.54   0.52   0.23   0.14   1.00    38
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Total Assets is the log of total assets by the end of IPO year; M/B is the market value divided by book value 
of total equity at the end of IPO year; Leverage is the total liability divided by total sales; Total Assets, M/B 
and Leverage are all winsorized at top and bottom 5%. Rich100 is set equal to 1 if the ultimate owner of 
entrepreneur owned  firms appears at least once in the list of Forbes top-100 richest people in China from 
2000 to 2004, and 0 otherwise; Rich400 is set equal to 1 if the owner appears in the China’s top-400 richest 
people list compiled by New Fortune but not in the Forbes list, and 0 otherwise; Marketization, Legal 
Environment and Property Rights are indexes compiled by Fan and Wang (2000) to capture the development 
of markets, legal environment and protection for property rights at the provincial level for year 1999 and 
2000; Deregulation, an index compiled by Demruger et al. (2003) based on the preferential policies granted 
to the provinces, measures the level of deregulation and competition of a region; R&D, which includes 
expenditures on fundamental research, application research, experimental development and capital 
construction for scientific research in regions in year 2000, is collected from the National Bureau of 
Statistics; Unemployment is the officially reported unemployment rate for each year at the provincial level; 
Fiscal surplus is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the fiscal surplus is in the top quartile of all the 
provinces and 0 otherwise. A more detailed description of these macro variables are presented in Appendix 
1.  
    N Mean  Median  Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
Government-controlled Firms                     
Total Assets  750   13.47   13.42   0.81   11.77   16.05  
M/B  750   4.21   3.90   2.01   1.18   12.99  
Leverage  750   1.78   0.75   4.99   0.08   40.05  
Entrepreneur-controlled Firms                     
Rich100  61  0.26   0.00   0.04   0.00   1.00  
Rich400  61  0.19   0.00   0.4  0.00   1.00  
Total Assets  61  13.27   13.34   0.75   12.03   15.85  
M/B  61  5.93   5.56   2.61   1.88   12.99  
Leverage  61  2.41   0.99   5.69   0.80   40.05  
Macro Variables                         
Marketization  30  5.71  5.57  1.38  2.75  8.26 
Legal Environment  30  5.12  5.03  1.20  2.44  7.75 
Property Rights  30  6.22  6.32  1.48  2.53  8.85 
Deregulation  30  0.92  0.67  0.68  0.33  2.86 
R&D (%)  30  0.89  0.61  1.15  0.11  6.30 
Unemployment (%)  220  3.06  3.20  1.12  0.40  7.40 
Fiscal Surplus  220  0.25  0.00  0.43  0.00  1.00   39
Table 4 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Pyramids of Government-
controlled Firms (I) 
The dependent variable is the number of corporate pyramidal layers between government and listed 
firm. Definition of independent variables is presented in Table 3. In addition Regulated Industry 
equals one if the firm is in the resources, public utilities, finance, or transportation sectors. All of 
the regressions include year dummies (not reported). Ordered probit model is adopted.. Z-value is 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 
10%. 
Independent  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 -0.136    -0.077 
Unemployment 
 (2.93)***     (1.92)* 
   0.581    0.480 
Fiscal Surplus 
   (4.04)***    (2.21)** 
    0.087  0.015 
R&D 
    (2.38)**  (0.41) 
0.203 0.178 0.179 0.195 0.167 
Total Assets 
(2.65)*** (2.83)*** (2.84)*** (3.12)***  (2.42)** 
0.054 0.050 0.042 0.052 0.041 
M/B 
(1.14) (1.89)* (1.57) (1.98)** (0.94) 
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 
Leverage 
(3.65)***  (2.38)*** (2.39)**  (2.5)*** (3.04)*** 
0.067 0.051 0.085 0.069 0.073 
Regulated Industry 
(0.43) (0.36) (0.59) (0.48) (0.46) 
N  750 750 750 750 750 
Pseudo R-square  0.074 0.078 0.083 0.076 0.085 
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Table 5 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Pyramids of 
Government-controlled Firms (II) 
The dependent variable is the number of corporate pyramidal layers between government 
and listed firm. Definition of independent variables is presented in Table 3. In addition 
Regulated Industry equals one if the firm is in the resources, public utilities, finance, or 
transportation sectors. All of the regressions include year dummies (not reported). Ordered 
probit model is adopted for all four models. Z-value is reported in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote levels of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.077         Marketization 
(2.11)**      
 0.183        Legal Environment 
 (6.23)***    
   0.103      Property Rights 
   (4.08)***  
    0.199    Deregulation 
    (2.48)** 
-0.038   0.030   -0.025   -0.033   Unemployment 
(0.79) (0.67) (0.63) (0.69) 
0.483   0.331   0.340   0.403   Fiscal Surplus 
(2.24)**  (1.64)* (1.60) (1.71)* 
0.033   0.007   0.035   0.048   R&D 
(0.77) (0.18) (0.93) (1.00) 
0.160   0.152   0.168   0.161   Total Assets 
(2.35)**  (2.35)** (2.5)** (2.42)** 
0.040   0.043   0.045   0.041   M/B 
(0.92) (0.96) (0.99) (0.93) 
0.019   0.017   0.018   0.017   Leverage 
(3.08)*** (2.46)**  (2.43)** (2.82)*** 
0.059   0.030   0.050   0.041   Regulated Industry 
(0.38) (0.18) (0.29) (0.27) 
N  750 750 750 747 
Pseudo R-square  0.088 0.095 0.091 0.093 
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Table 6 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Pyramids of Entrepreneur-controlled Firms
For model (1) through model (8), the dependent variable is the number of corporate pyramidal layers between entrepreneur 
and listed firm. Ordered probit model is adopted for all eight models. The z-values, in absolute term, are reported in 
parentheses. For Model (9), the dependent variable is the ratio of cash flow to voting rights. Ordinary least squares method is 
adopted for estimating this model.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Definition of independent variables is presented 
in Table 3 and Appendix 1. In addition Regulated Industry equals one if the firm is in the resources, public utilities, finance, 
or transportation sectors. All of the regressions include year dummies (not reported).  Asterisks denote levels of statistical 
significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
Independent 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     0.097       Marketization 
     ( 1 . 0 5 )       
      - 0 . 0 1 4     Legal 
Environment        ( 0 . 1 1 )      
       - 0 . 0 8 8      Property Rights 
       ( 0 . 6 1 )     
        0.275    Deregulation 
        ( 1 . 8 1 ) *    
  - 0 . 1 1 9           Unemployment 
  ( 0 . 8 4 )          
   0.472         Fiscal Surplus 
   ( 1 . 1 6 )         
    -0.150       R&D 
    (0.89)       
-1.007 -0.968 -1.033 -0.971 -0.868 -1.013 -1.052 -0.857  0.205  Rich100 
(2.04)** (1.88)* (2.21)** (1.93)* (1.87)* (2.13)** (2.26)** (1.63) (2.67)**
0.078 0.127 0.183 0.123 0.156 0.064 -0.020 0.214 0.047  Rich400 
(0.25) (0.42) (0.47) (0.45) (0.62) (0.25) (0.07) (0.68) (0.58) 
0.142 0.120 0.085 0.121 0.124 0.149 0.203 0.039 -0.032  Total Assets 
(0.8)  (0.67) (0.46) (0.62) (0.76) (1.05) (1.48) (0.22) (0.57) 
0.103 0.100 0.092 0.107 0.099 0.104 0.107 0.089 0.001  M/B 
(1.67)*  (1.66)*  (1.66) (1.76) (1.62) (1.62) (1.59) (1.34) (0.07) 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.014 0.001  -0.006  Leverage 
(0.51) (0.34) (0.44) (0.48) (0.34) (0.51) (0.69) (0.06) (0.95) 
-0.157 -0.082 0.033 -0.190 -0.022 -0.176 -0.249 0.084  0.017  Regulated 
Industry  (0.2)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.23) (0.03) (0.21) (0.31)  (0.1)  (1.14) 
N  62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Pseudo R-square  0.114 0.120 0.126 0.124 0.122 0.116  0.12  0.134  0.23   42
Table 7 
Corporate Pyramids and IPO Initial Returns (Underpricing) 
Initial return is the difference between the IPO-day closing price and offering 





N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Government-controlled Firms      
1  176   2.440   1.692   1.850   0.413   5.617  
2  447   1.619   1.238   1.352   0.413   5.617  
3  79   1.717   1.136   1.515   0.413   5.617  
>=4  8   1.916   1.414   1.380   0.413   5.617  
Total  709  1.836   1.315   1.546   0.413   4.767  
        
Entrepreneur-controlled Firms      
1  1  2.081   2.081   -  2.081   2.081  
2  40  2.148   1.466   1.601   0.413   5.617  
3  17  2.046   1.784   1.416   0.413   5.617  
>=4  3  1.143   0.929   0.486   0.801   1.700  
Total  62  2.069   1.508   1.502   0.413   5.617    43
Table 8 
Regression Results of the Effects of Corporate Pyramids on the IPO Initial Returns of Government-
controlled Firms 
The dependent variable is IPO initial return measured as the difference between the IPO-day closing price and offering price 
divided by the offering price. Sales is the log of total sales in IPO year; Leverage is the long-term liability divided by total 
sales in IPO year; Market Return is the return of the corresponding market of the IPO firm on the initial return day; Proceeds 
is the total amount raised from IPO standardized by total equity at the IPO year end. Other independent variables are defined 
in Table 3 and Appendix 1. In addition Regulated Industry equals one if the firm is in the resources, public utilities, finance, 
or transportation sectors. The regressions also include year dummies (not reported). Ordinary least squares regression is 
adopted for all the models. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
-0.207  -0.193  -0.206  -0.188  -0.232  -0.220  -0.235  Pyramidal 
Layers 
(2.74)***  (2.52)**  (2.69)***  (2.47)**  (3.06)***  (2.90)***  (3.08)*** 
-0.074         Marketization 
(2.11)**        
  -0.069        Legal 
Environment 
  (1.76)*       
   -0.035       Property Rights 
   (1.09)      
    -0.195      Deregulation 
    (3.25)***     
     0.061     R&D 
     (1.60)    
      0.001    Unemployment 
      (0.01)   
       0.172  Fiscal Surplus 
       (1.16) 
-3.533  -3.558  -3.595  -3.629  -3.604  -3.574  -3.589  Sales 
(7.70)***  (7.75)***  (7.82)***  (7.93)***  (7.84)***  (7.76)***  (7.81)*** 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  Leverage 
(3.34)***  (3.18)***  (3.22)***  (3.28)***  (3.33)***  (3.26)***  (3.25)*** 
4.464  4.567  4.591  4.439  4.567  4.552  4.478  Market Return 
(6.64)***  (6.80)***  (6.81)***  (6.62)***  (6.79)***  (6.76)***  (6.63)*** 
-2.988  -2.959  -2.938  -3.011  -2.920  -2.939  -2.931  Proceeds 
(12.94)*** (12.85)***  (12.76)*** (13.07)*** (12.68)*** (12.75)***  (12.72)***
-0.287  -0.285  -0.299  -0.268  -0.308  -0.309  -0.309  Regulated 
industry  (1.93)*  (1.91)*  (2.01)**  (1.81)*  (2.08)**  (2.07)**  (2.08)** 
13.797  13.729  13.670  13.847  13.423  13.381  13.288  Constant 
(11.63)*** (11.57)***  (11.38)*** (11.78)*** (11.46)*** (11.23)***  (11.31)***
N  709  709  709  706  709  709  709 
R-squared  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.44  0.44  0.44   44
Table 9 
Regression Results of the Effects of Corporate Pyramids on IPO Initial Returns of Entrepreneur-
controlled Firms 
The dependent variable is IPO initial return measured as the difference between the IPO-day closing price and offering price 
divided by the offering price.  Sales is the log of total sales in IPO year; Leverage is the long-term liability divided by total sales 
in IPO year; Market Return is the return of the corresponding market of the IPO firm on the initial return day; Proceeds is the 
total amount raised from IPO standardized by total equity at the IPO year end. Regulated Industry equals one if the firm is in the 
resources, public utilities, finance, or transportation sectors. Other independent variables are defined in Table 3 and Appendix 1. 
Ordinary least squares regression is adopted for all the models. The regressions also include year dummies (not reported). The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
-0.038  -0.086  -0.088  -0.037  -0.054  -0.091  -0.079  Pyramidal 
Layers 
(0.15)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.37)  (0.32) 
-0.096         Marketization 
(0.92)        
  -0.103        Legal Environment 
  (0.86)       
   -0.017       Property Rights 
   (0.15)      
    -0.137      Deregulation 
    (0.79)     
     0.128     R&D 
     (0.97)    
      -0.027    Unemployment 
      (0.17)   
       -0.111  Fiscal Surplus 
       (0.28) 
-2.326  -2.245  -2.226  -2.278  -1.984  -2.252  -2.332  Sales 
(1.65)  (1.59)  (1.54)  (1.61)  (1.38)  (1.58)  (1.62) 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  Leverage 
(1.21)  (1.26)  (1.38)  (1.13)  (1.41)  (1.40)  (1.32) 
6.421  6.337  6.190  6.431  6.221  6.138  6.182  Market Return 
(2.74)***  (2.71)***  (2.62)**  (2.73)***  (2.67)**  (2.61)**  (2.63)** 
-3.365  -3.325  -3.385  -3.299  -3.430  -3.402  -3.377  Proceeds 
(4.39)***  (4.31)***  (4.37)***  (4.25)***  (4.48)***  (4.39)***  (4.36)*** 
0.024  0.076  0.202  0.103  0.208  0.233  0.190  Regulated industry 
(0.03)  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.32)  (0.35)  (0.29) 
10.513  10.368  9.810  9.907  8.941  9.817  10.023  Constant 
(2.87)***  (2.85)***  (2.72)***  (2.76)***  (2.44)**  (2.72)***  (2.70)*** 
Observations  62  62  62  62  62  62  62 
R-squared  0.61  0.61  0.60  0.61  0.61  0.60  0.60   45
Appendix 1 
Definitions of Macro Variables 
Variable      Description     Sources 
Marketization     
This is a comprehensive index that captures the regional market development of the 
following aspects: (1) relationship between government and market, such as role of 
market in allocating resources and enterprises' burden in addition to normal taxes; (2) 
development of non-state business, such as ratio of industrial output by private sector to 
total industrial output;  (3) development of product market, such as regional trade 
barrier; (4) development of factor market such as FDI and mobility of labor; (5) 
development of market intermediaries and legal environment such as protection of 
property rights. We use the average of the 1999 and 2000 indexes in our analyses. 
    Fan and Wang (2001) 
Legal Environment     
A component of marketization index, which measures the development of market 
intermediaries, protection of property rights, protection of copyrights and consumers. 
We use the average of the 1999 and 2000 indexes in our analyses. 
    Fan and Wang (2001) 
Property rights     
A component of the index of legal environment, which measures (1) market order, 
calculated based on total economic legal cases standardized by GPD of the region, and 
(2) court efficiency, a ratio of the solved legal cases to total cases received. We use the 
average of the 1999 and 2000 indexes in our analyses. 
    Fan and Wang (2001) 
Deregulation      The amount of preferential treatments granted to the region by central government to set 
up special economic zones from 1978 to 1998.       Demruger et al. (2002) 
Unemployment (%)       The unemployment rate officially reported data for each province from 1993 to 2001.      China Information Bank 
Fiscal Surplus      A dummy variable, equals one if the fiscal surplus standardized by GDP is among the 
top quartile in the country, and zero otherwise.      China Information 
Network Data Co., Ltd. 
 
R&D (%) 
    Expenditures on fundamental research, application research, experimental development 
and capital construction for scientific research in the region.       National Bureau of 
Statistics  
 
 